Origin OUSD
Score Breakdown
| Category | Weight | Score |
|---|---|---|
| Audits & Historical | 20% | 1.50 |
| Centralization & Control | 30% | 2.00 |
| Funds Management | 30% | 1.75 |
| Liquidity Risk | 15% | 2.50 |
| Operational Risk | 5% | 1.00 |
| Final Score | 1.9 / 5.0 | |
Low Risk
Overview
Origin Dollar (OUSD) is a rebasing stablecoin backed 100% by USDC. Holders' wallet balances automatically increase as yield accrues, without staking, locking, or manual compounding. Smart contracts must opt in to receive rebased yield; those that don't forfeit rewards to standard holders, amplifying returns for participants. An ERC-4626 wrapper (wOUSD) is available for DeFi composability, appreciating in value instead of rebasing.
OUSD generates yield through three mechanisms:
- Morpho Lending (~$3.33M, ~45% of TVL) — Deposits USDC into a MetaMorpho vault for over-collateralized lending yield
- Curve AMO (~$1.02M, ~14% of TVL) — Algorithmic Market Operations providing liquidity in the Curve OUSD/USDC pool, earning trading fees and CRV incentives
- Cross-Chain Strategies (~$3.09M, ~42% of TVL) — Bridges USDC via Circle CCTP to Base (~$2.11M) and HyperEVM (~$977K)
Collateral was simplified from multi-stablecoin (USDT, DAI, USDC) to USDC-only via governance proposal in November 2025.
- Launch Date: September 18, 2020 (relaunched January 5, 2021 after November 2020 hack)
- Performance Fee: 20% (2,000 bps), collected by Trustee multisig
- Total Value: ~$7.43M (vault
totalValue()at block 25394922)
Links:
Risk Summary
Key Strengths
- On-chain xOGN governance with ~5-day total cycle, self-administered Timelock, no admin backdoor — identical governance to audited Origin ARM
- 9 OUSD-specific audits by top firms (OpenZeppelin, Trail of Bits, Sigma Prime, Solidified, Certora formal verification) + $1M Immunefi bounty
- ~5 years clean track record since January 2021 relaunch, with lessons learned from 2020 hack
- Standard minting always requires USDC collateral deposit — permissionless and fully backed
- AMO minting constrained by 99.8% solvency check, pool balance improvement requirement, and governance-controlled whitelist
Key Risks
- AMO
mintForStrategy()can mint OUSD without direct backing (constrained to ~0.2% of supply), and historical vault-level cap has been deprecated - Strategist (2-of-8 multisig) has broad untimelocked power: AMO operations, strategy allocation (
withdrawAllFromStrategies,setDefaultStrategy,depositToStrategy), vault parameters (setVaultBuffer,setDripDuration,setRebaseRateMax), pause controls, and yield delegation (delegateYield/undelegateYieldcan redirect any account's rebase yield) - Single collateral dependency on USDC (Circle) — centralized stablecoin with freeze capabilities
- Cross-chain strategies (~42% of TVL) add bridge risk and reduce immediate redemption liquidity
- Morpho concentration: ~45% of TVL sits in a single MetaMorpho vault (mOUSD-V2), dependent on its curator's market allocations
- Modest TVL (~$7.43M, down from $275M peak) suggests concentration risk and reduced market confidence; the Curve OUSD/USDC pool only holds ~$448K USDC on the buy-side, capping instant DEX exit
vaultBufferparameter is 0 — effective idle USDC is ~0 after subtracting queue reserve; redemptions flow through async withdrawal queue with no on-chain upper bound on claim time- Active withdrawal queue of ~$1.68M (≈22.7% of OUSD supply) signals meaningful exit intent; queue is currently caught up and the strategist is processing claims, but a large new wave of redemptions would depend on Morpho liquidity or cross-chain unwinds
Critical Risks
- None identified. All critical gates pass.
- Historical $7.7M hack (November 2020) was on a different codebase; protocol was completely relaunched with audited contracts.
Full Report
Contract Addresses
Audits and Due Diligence Disclosures
OUSD has been audited extensively across its lifecycle. Key OUSD-specific audits:
| # | Date | Firm | Scope | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Dec 2020 | Trail of Bits | OUSD (pre-relaunch) | Report |
| 2 | Dec 2020 | Solidified | OUSD (pre-relaunch) | Report |
| 3 | Oct 2021 | OpenZeppelin | Origin Dollar | Report |
| 4 | Jun 2022 | OpenZeppelin | Origin Dollar Governance | Report |
| 5 | Oct 2022 | OpenZeppelin | Origin Dollar Convex | Report |
| 6 | Apr 2023 | OpenZeppelin | OUSD Dripper & Uniswap Strategy | Report |
| 7 | Dec 2024 | Certora | Formal Verification (OUSD) | Report |
| 8 | Dec 2024 | OpenZeppelin | Origin OUSD | Report |
| 9 | Feb 2026 | Sigma Prime | OUSD Upgrade Security Assessment v2 | Report |
Origin Protocol maintains 30+ audit reports across all products in their security repository. They have a continuous auditing agreement with OpenZeppelin to review 100% of smart contract changes.
Smart Contract Complexity: High - Upgradeable proxy pattern (EIP-1967), rebasing token with non-standard ERC-20 behavior, AMO minting mechanism, 4 active strategies including cross-chain via CCTP, oracle integration.
Bug Bounty
- Platform: Immunefi
- Maximum Payout: $1,000,000 (critical smart contract, capped at 10% of economic damage, min $50,000)
- Scope: OUSD token contract explicitly in-scope (34 assets total)
- Safe Harbor: Enabled via SEAL team
- Link: https://immunefi.com/bug-bounty/originprotocol/scope/
Historical Track Record
- Launched: September 18, 2020 (~5.5 years in production)
- Relaunched: January 5, 2021 (after November 2020 hack, with fresh audits)
- November 17, 2020 — OUSD Flash Loan Reentrancy Attack ($7.7M loss):
- Attack: Exploited missing input validation in
mintMultiple()and lack of reentrancy protection. Attacker used a malicious ERC-20 contract to re-enter the mint function, inflating OUSD supply without depositing backing collateral. - Impact: 11,809 ETH + 2,249,821 DAI stolen (~$7.7M), including $1M+ from Origin founders/employees.
- Resolution: Deposits immediately disabled. $1M bounty offered for fund recovery. All existing OUSD balances reset to zero upon relaunch.
- Compensation: Users <=1,000 OUSD received 100% in newly minted OUSD. Users >1,000 OUSD received 25% OUSD + 75% in OGN tokens (1-year lock, 25% interest). Founders received no compensation.
- Source: PeckShield Root Cause Analysis, rekt.news
- Attack: Exploited missing input validation in
- Post-relaunch incidents: None in ~5 years since relaunch
- TVL history: Peak ~$275M (December 2021), current ~$7.43M — significant decline from peak
- Price stability: Post-relaunch peg maintained within a few basis points of $1.00. Minor deviation to $0.9671 in March 2022.
- Team: Origin Protocol since 2017. Founded by Josh Fraser & Matthew Liu. CEO: Rafael Ugolini. Backed by Pantera Capital, Founders Fund.
Funds Management
Strategy Allocation (from vault totalValue() = ~$7,426,782 at block 25394922):
| Strategy | Balance (USDC) | % of TVL | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| Morpho V2 | ~3,325,590 | ~45% | MetaMorpho vault (mOUSD-V2) lending |
| Curve USDC AMO | ~1,015,370 | ~14% | Curve OUSD/USDC pool + gauge staking |
| Cross-Chain (Base) | ~2,108,562 | ~28% | USDC bridged via Circle CCTP to Base |
| Cross-Chain (HyperEVM) | ~977,259 | ~13% | USDC bridged via Circle CCTP to HyperEVM |
| Vault (idle) | ~0 | <0.01% | Effective idle vault USDC (raw balance ~17,205 fully reserved against the withdrawal queue's queued − claimed); vaultBuffer parameter = 0 |
Reward tokens (CRV, MORPHO) are sold via CoW Protocol into USDC and returned to the vault, where they are distributed to holders via rebase.
Accessibility
- Minting: Permissionless. Anyone can call
mint()by depositing USDC; the vault mints equivalent OUSD 1:1. RequiressafeTransferFromof USDC — cannot mint without depositing collateral. - AMO Minting: The Curve AMO strategy can call
mintForStrategy()to mint OUSD without direct user-deposited backing (see AMO Minting Analysis below). Only governor-whitelisted strategies can use this function. - Redemption: Async withdrawal queue — two-step process:
requestWithdrawal(amount)burns OUSD immediately and enqueues a withdrawal (NFT-like request ID).claimWithdrawal(id)/claimWithdrawals(ids[])pays out USDC afterwithdrawalClaimDelay(600s = 10 minutes minimum, verified on-chain) AND when the queue's claimable liquidity has caught up to the request. There is no on-chain upper bound on claim time — if the queue is ahead of deposits/strategy withdrawals, a claim can wait indefinitely. The strategist (or anyone permissionlessly, viaallocate()/ strategy pulls) must supply USDC to advance the queue.
- DEX Swaps: Instant exits via Curve OUSD/USDC pool (~$1.10M TVL).
- Fees: 20% performance fee (2,000 bps), no deposit/withdrawal fees.
AMO Minting Analysis
Can OUSD be minted without backing? Yes, through the AMO mechanism, but with constraints:
mintForStrategy()allows whitelisted strategies to mint OUSD without depositing collateral. Currently only the Curve USDC AMO strategy (0x26a02ec47ACC2A3442b757F45E0A82B8e993Ce11) is whitelisted.- Adding strategies to the mint whitelist requires governance (xOGN vote + 48h timelock).
- Solvency check: After every AMO operation,
_solvencyAssert()verifies thattotalVaultValue / totalOUSDSupply >= 99.8%(SOLVENCY_THRESHOLD). This caps the maximum unbacked OUSD at ~0.2% of total supply. - Pool balance check: The
improvePoolBalancemodifier ensures one-sided operations (mint-and-add or remove-and-burn) must improve the Curve pool's balance. Sequential operations in the same direction are prevented. maxSupplyDiff: Set to 5% (checked during redemptions) — if supply exceeds backing by >5%, redemptions revert.- Historical minting cap (
netOusdMintForStrategyThreshold) has been deprecated. There is no vault-level per-strategy cap. Protection relies on the strategy-level solvency check.
Risk assessment: AMO-minted OUSD enters the Curve pool (not free circulation). It can only be obtained by someone swapping USDC for it, at which point it becomes backed. The strategist (2-of-8 multisig) can trigger AMO operations without governance vote. The 99.8% solvency threshold limits exploitation but the deprecated vault-level cap is a design choice worth monitoring.
Collateralization
- 100% backed by USDC (single collateral since November 2025)
- Funds deployed across 4 strategies;
vaultBufferparameter = 0 (no idle reserve target). Raw vault USDC at the snapshot block is ~17,205, fully reserved against pending withdrawal requests (effective idle ≈ 0) - No debt, leverage, or liquidation mechanics in the vault itself
- Morpho strategy uses over-collateralized lending markets
- Cross-chain strategies bridge ~42% of TVL to HyperEVM and Base via Circle CCTP — these funds are not immediately accessible for Ethereum redemptions
Provability
- On-chain verification:
vault.totalValue()returns the sum of strategy balances plus vault USDC, minus the withdrawal-queue reserve (queued − claimed). The same is true ofvault.checkBalance(asset). Raw vault USDC and the queue reserve must be inspected separately to reconstruct each component. ousd.totalSupply()lives on the OUSD token, not on the vault. The vault parametermaxSupplyDiff(5%) and the AMOSOLVENCY_THRESHOLD(99.8%) compare these two sources at redemption / AMO time.- Rebase calculated programmatically:
rebasingCreditsPerTokendetermines each holder's share of rebased yield - Oracle Router (
0x36CFB852d3b84afB3909BCf4ea0dbe8C82eE1C3c) is non-upgradeable with hardcoded Chainlink feeds (USDC/USD) - Cross-chain strategy balances are self-reported from CCTP bridge amounts — require checking destination chains for full verification
- 100% on-chain for Ethereum-based strategies; cross-chain portion (~42%) requires multi-chain verification
Liquidity Risk
- Primary exit: Async withdrawal queue via
requestWithdrawal()→claimWithdrawal(). OUSD is burned at request time; USDC is paid only after (a)withdrawalClaimDelayof 10 minutes AND (b) queue claimable liquidity has advanced past the request. No on-chain upper bound on wait time — effective wait depends on how quickly strategies return USDC. Per the on-chain queue (withdrawalQueueMetadata()),queued = claimable ≈ $1,684,584withnextWithdrawalIndex = 67, so the queue is currently caught up; a flush of large new requests would have to wait on Morpho redemptions or CCTP unwinds. - DEX liquidity: Curve OUSD/USDC pool (
0x6d18E1a7faeB1F0467A77C0d293872ab685426dc) at the snapshot block holds ~653K OUSD + ~448K USDC (nominal TVL ~$1.10M).get_dy(0,1, 100k OUSD)≈ 99,945 USDC,get_dy(0,1, 300k OUSD)≈ 299,557 USDC, andget_dy(0,1, 500k OUSD)≈ 446,294 USDC; the USDC side is only ~$448K, so swap exits beyond ~$450K OUSD will deplete it quickly. - Vault buffer:
vaultBufferparameter = 0; raw vault USDC at the snapshot block is ~17,205, fully reserved against pending claims (effective idle ≈ 0). Queue advancement therefore depends on the strategist pulling from strategies (withdrawFromStrategy/withdrawAllFromStrategies) or on new deposits auto-allocating to cover requests. - Withdrawal queue depth:
withdrawalQueueMetadata()reportsqueued = claimable ≈ $1,684,584withnextWithdrawalIndex = 67. The queue represents ~22.7% of the ~7,414,516 OUSDtotalSupply()— a meaningful concentration of exit intent, but the queue is fully caught up (claimable = queued) and the strategist is actively servicing claims (claimWithdrawal/addWithdrawalQueueLiquiditycalls observed in recent blocks). - Cross-chain assets: ~$3.09M (~42% of TVL) on Base and HyperEVM — cannot be immediately redeemed on Ethereum, requires CCTP bridging back (minutes to hours).
- No priority mechanism — first-come-first-served queue ordering.
- Same-value assets (USD stablecoins) mitigate price impact risk during any waiting period.
- Legacy OUSD/3CRV pool: ~$30K TVL, effectively deprecated.
Centralization & Control Risks
Governance
Governance Structure: Identical to Origin ARM — same xOGN governance, same Timelock, same multisig. See Appendix: Contract Architecture for full diagram.
Timelock Roles (verified via hasRole()):
| Role | Origin DeFi Governance | GOV Multisig (5/8) |
|---|---|---|
| PROPOSER | ✓ | ✗ |
| EXECUTOR | ✓ | ✗ |
| CANCELLER | ✓ | ✓ |
- Timelock is self-administered (TIMELOCK_ADMIN_ROLE held by itself)
- Total time from proposal to execution: ~5 days minimum (24h voting delay + 48h voting + 48h timelock)
- No backdoor — only Origin DeFi Governance can propose/execute
GOV Multisig Signers (5-of-8, verified via getOwners() at block 25394922):
0x530d3F8C, 0x052c01a2, 0x336C02D3, 0x6AC8d65D, 0x617a3582, 0x17aBc3F0, 0x39772922, 0x9990C10c
Privileged Roles:
| Role | Who | Timelock? | Powers |
|---|---|---|---|
| Governor (owner) | Timelock → xOGN governance | ~5 days | Upgrade proxy, approve/remove strategies, add/remove from mint whitelist, setAutoAllocateThreshold, setMaxSupplyDiff, setWithdrawalClaimDelay, setTrusteeFeeBps, setTrusteeAddress, setStrategistAddr, set oracle, governanceRebaseOptIn |
| Strategist | 2-of-8 Safe 0x4FF1...971 |
None | Vault (all onlyGovernorOrStrategist): depositToStrategy / withdrawFromStrategy / withdrawAllFromStrategy / withdrawAllFromStrategies, setVaultBuffer, setDefaultStrategy, setRebaseRateMax, setDripDuration, setRebaseThreshold, pauseCapital / pauseRebase, unpauseCapital / unpauseRebase, rebase. Curve AMO: mintAndAddOTokens / removeAndBurnOTokens / removeOnlyAssets (AMO ops), reward harvesting. OUSD Token (onlyGovernorOrStrategist): delegateYield(from, to), undelegateYield(from) — can redirect rebase yield of any account to any other account without that account's consent. |
| Trustee | 1-of-3 Safe 0xBB07...c8c |
None | Receives 20% performance fee |
Key Risks:
- AMO minting without timelock: The Strategist can trigger AMO mint/burn operations, constrained by the strategy-level 99.8% solvency check. The vault-level AMO minting cap (
netOusdMintForStrategyThreshold) is deprecated (function reverts on-chain). - Yield delegation without timelock:
delegateYield/undelegateYieldon the OUSD token areonlyGovernorOrStrategist— the strategist can redirect the rebase yield of any account (including smart contracts holding OUSD) to an arbitrary recipient. This is a non-trivial power over holder yield. - Strategy reallocation without timelock: The strategist can move all vault funds to/from any approved strategy (
withdrawAllFromStrategies,setDefaultStrategy,depositToStrategy). Bounded by what's already on the governor-approved strategy list. - Rebase rate cap without timelock:
setRebaseRateMaxlets the strategist cap daily rebase APR — misconfiguration could strand yield.
Programmability
- Standard minting/redeeming: fully programmatic and permissionless
- Rebase: triggered automatically during user operations when yield exceeds
rebaseThreshold(1,000 USDC); also callable by strategist - Auto-allocation: triggered when deposits exceed
autoAllocateThreshold(25,000 USDC) - AMO operations and inter-strategy rebalancing: require strategist intervention
- Cross-chain strategy management: requires manual bridging decisions
- Reward harvesting: CoW Harvester sells CRV/MORPHO → USDC via CoW Protocol (semi-automated, bot-triggered)
External Dependencies
- USDC / Circle (Critical) — Sole collateral asset. OUSD is 100% backed by USDC. Circle can freeze/blacklist addresses holding USDC, which could impact vault or strategy contracts.
- Morpho (Critical) — ~45% of TVL deployed into MetaMorpho vault (mOUSD-V2). Curator:
0xe5e2Baf96198c56380dDD5E992D7d1ADa0e989c0(Gnosis Safe). Largest single dependency. - Curve (High) — AMO yield generation (~14% of TVL) and primary on-Ethereum DEX liquidity (~$1.10M pool TVL, ~$448K USDC side). AMO strategy deposits into Curve OUSD/USDC pool.
- Circle CCTP (High) — Cross-chain strategies use Circle CCTP V2 to bridge USDC to HyperEVM and Base. ~42% of TVL is held on remote chains.
- Chainlink (High) — Oracle Router uses Chainlink USDC/USD feed for price verification. Non-upgradeable router contract.
- CoW Protocol (Low) — Used for reward token swaps (CRV, MORPHO → USDC). Not critical for core functionality.
No single-point-of-failure that would break the protocol entirely, but USDC dependency means a Circle freeze on key addresses would be highly disruptive.
Operational Risk
- Team: Origin Protocol since 2017, public team, known leadership (Josh Fraser, Matthew Liu, Rafael Ugolini), VC-backed (Pantera, Founders Fund)
- Documentation: Comprehensive. Public GitHub with active development, dedicated security repo with 30+ audits
- Legal: Established company (Origin Protocol)
- Incident Response: Learned from 2020 hack. $1M bug bounty on Immunefi. Safe Harbor enabled via SEAL team. Full relaunch with multiple audits after incident.
Monitoring
- Governance: Monitor Timelock events (
CallScheduled,CallExecuted,Cancelled) on0x35918cDE7233F2dD33fA41ae3Cb6aE0e42E0e69F. Monitor EIP-1967 implementation slot changes on Vault and OUSD Token proxies. Monitor Origin DeFi Governance proposals. - Vault Parameters: Track
totalValue()on the vault (0xE75D...F70) andtotalSupply()on the OUSD token (0x2A8e...E86). Alert on >1% divergence between vaulttotalValue()and tokentotalSupply(). Note:totalValue()andcheckBalance(asset)already subtract the withdrawal-queue reserve (queued − claimed); reconstruct components by reading the strategycheckBalance()calls, the vault's raw USDC balance, andwithdrawalQueueMetadata()separately. MonitorrebasePaused()andcapitalPaused()state changes on the vault. TrackmaxSupplyDiff,vaultBuffer,defaultStrategy,dripDuration, andrebasePerSecondMaxchanges (several settable by strategist without timelock). - AMO: Monitor
mintForStrategy()calls and OUSD supply vs vault value ratio. Alert if solvency drops below 99.5%. TrackisMintWhitelistedStrategychanges (requires governance). - Strategy Allocation: Monitor strategy balances via
checkBalance()on each strategy contract. Alert on >20% TVL change in 24h. Track cross-chain strategy CCTP bridge transactions. - Oracle: Monitor Chainlink USDC/USD feed staleness on
0x8fFfFfd4AfB6115b954Bd326cbe7B4BA576818f6. Alert if price deviates >1% from $1.00. - Liquidity: Monitor Curve OUSD/USDC pool balance ratio. Alert on significant imbalance (>60/40 split). Track vault USDC raw balance vs. queue reserve (
queued − claimed) — the difference is what is actually available to advance the queue or rebalance to strategies. - Morpho: Monitor MetaMorpho vault (mOUSD-V2) at
0xFB154c729A16802c4ad1E8f7FF539a8b9f49c960. Track curator changes and market allocations. - Strategist: Monitor role changes on vault
strategistAddr(). Track AMO operations frequency and size. MonitorYieldDelegated/YieldUndelegatedevents on the OUSD token for yield redirection activity. MonitorwithdrawAllFromStrategies,setVaultBuffer,setDefaultStrategy,setDripDuration,setRebaseRateMaxcalls (untimelocked strategist powers). - Withdrawal Queue: Track
withdrawalQueueMetadata()on the vault to monitor queue depth (requested vs claimable). Alert when queue backlog (requested − claimable) exceeds available vault + Morpho liquidity — indicates redemption delays.
Reassessment Triggers
- Time-based: Quarterly (next: July 2026)
- Incident-based: Any security incident, AMO solvency anomaly, or USDC depeg/freeze event
- Change-based: New strategy added to mint whitelist, MetaMorpho vault curator change, new cross-chain deployment, governance parameter changes, or significant TVL changes (>50%)
Appendix: Contract Architecture
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ GOVERNANCE │
│ │
│ xOGN Token Holders (Staked OGN) │
│ (100K xOGN to propose, ~274M xOGN quorum) │
│ │ │
│ ▼ │
│ Origin DeFi Governance (0x1D3f...) │
│ [PROPOSER + EXECUTOR + CANCELLER] │
│ (7,200 blocks voting delay + 14,416 blocks voting period) │
│ │ │
│ ▼ │
│ Timelock Controller (0x3591...) GOV Multisig 5/8 │
│ [48h delay, self-administered] ◄────── (0xbe2A...) │
│ │ [CANCELLER only] │
│ │ governor │
│ ├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ ▼ ▼ │
│ OUSD Token (0x2A8e...) OUSD Vault (0xE75D│
│ [Rebasing ERC-20, proxy] [Proxy, impl: 0x82│
│ impl: 0xA7B7... │
│ │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ OUSD VAULT (0xE75D...) │
│ │
│ Supported Asset: USDC only (0xA0b8...) │
│ Oracle: Router (0x36CF...) → Chainlink USDC/USD [non-upgradeable] │
│ │
│ Roles: │
│ ├── governor: Timelock (0x3591...) [~5d timelock] │
│ │ approveStrategy, addStrategyToMintWhitelist, setTrusteeFeeBps, │
│ │ setAutoAllocateThreshold, setMaxSupplyDiff, │
│ │ setWithdrawalClaimDelay, setStrategistAddr, upgradeTo │
│ ├── strategistAddr: 2-of-8 Safe (0x4FF1...) "Origin: Guardian" [none] │
│ │ Vault: depositToStrategy, withdrawFromStrategy, │
│ │ withdrawAllFromStrategy(ies), setDefaultStrategy, setVaultBuffer, │
│ │ setDripDuration, setRebaseRateMax, setRebaseThreshold, │
│ │ pauseCapital/Rebase, unpauseCapital/Rebase, rebase. │
│ │ AMO: mintAndAddOTokens, removeAndBurnOTokens, harvest. │
│ │ OUSD Token: delegateYield, undelegateYield (any account). │
│ ├── trusteeAddress: 1-of-3 Safe (0xBB07...) receives 20% fee │
│ └── vaultBuffer: 0 (all funds deployed to strategies) │
│ │
│ Key Parameters: │
│ ├── rebaseThreshold: 1,000 USDC │
│ ├── autoAllocateThreshold: 25,000 USDC │
│ ├── maxSupplyDiff: 5% │
│ └── trusteeFeeBps: 2,000 (20%) │
│ │
│ Permissionless: mint, requestWithdrawal, claimWithdrawal(s), │
│ rebase (if threshold met), allocate │
│ │
└──────┬──────────────┬──────────────┬──────────────┬─────────────────────┘
│ │ │ │
▼ ▼ ▼ ▼
┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────┐
│ Curve USDC │ │ Morpho V2 │ │ Cross-Chain │ │ Cross-Chain │
│ AMO Strategy │ │ Strategy │ │ (Base) │ │ (HyperEVM) │
│ (0x26a0...) │ │ (0x3643...) │ │ (0xB1d6...) │ │ (0xE022...) │
│ ~$1.02M (14%)│ │ ~$3.33M (45%)│ │ ~$2.11M (28%)│ │ ~$977K (13%) │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
│ ┌──────────┐ │ │ ┌──────────┐ │ │ Circle CCTP │ │ Circle CCTP │
│ │Curve Pool│ │ │ │MetaMorpho│ │ │ → Base USDC │ │ → HyperEVM USDC │
│ │OUSD/USDC │ │ │ │mOUSD-V2 │ │ │ │ │ │
│ │(0x6d18..)│ │ │ │(0xFB15..)│ │ └──────────────┘ └──────────────────────┘
│ │~$1.10M │ │ │ │~$3.33M │ │
│ └──────────┘ │ │ └──────────┘ │
│ │ │ │ │ │
│ Gauge │ │ MORPHO │
│ (0x1eF8..) │ │ rewards │
│ → CRV │ │ │ │
│ rewards │ │ ▼ │
│ │ │ │ CoW Harvester│
│ ▼ │ │ (0xD400...) │
│ Strategist │ │ → USDC │
│ harvests │ │ │
└──────────────┘ └──────────────┘
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ AMO MINTING FLOW │
│ │
│ Curve AMO Strategy → mintForStrategy() → OUSD Token mints new OUSD │
│ [Whitelisted by governor] [No vault-level cap] [99.8% solvency] │
│ │
│ OUSD enters Curve pool → only obtainable by swapping USDC → backed │
│ │
│ Constraints: │
│ ├── _solvencyAssert(): totalValue/totalSupply >= 99.8% │
│ ├── improvePoolBalance: must improve pool ratio │
│ └── maxSupplyDiff: 5% (checked on redemption) │
│ │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ SECONDARY LIQUIDITY │
│ │
│ Curve Pool: OUSD/USDC (CurveStableSwapNG) │
│ (0x6d18...) ~$1.10M TVL (~653K OUSD + ~448K USDC) │
│ │
│ Legacy: OUSD/3CRV Metapool (0x8765...) ~$30K TVL [deprecated] │
│ │
│ wOUSD (0xD2af...): ERC-4626 wrapper for DeFi composability │
│ │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Data flows:
Mint: User USDC → Vault → mint OUSD 1:1
Redeem: requestWithdrawal (burns OUSD, enqueues request) →
wait >=600s AND queue liquidity advances →
claimWithdrawal(s) pays USDC (no on-chain upper bound on wait)
Rebase: Yield accrues → rebase increases all opted-in balances
AMO: Strategist → AMO Strategy → mintForStrategy → Curve pool
Yield: Morpho interest + CRV/MORPHO rewards → CoW Harvester → USDC → Vault
Bridge: Vault → Cross-Chain Strategy → CCTP → Base/HyperEVM USDC